18 November 2026 / 5 minutes of reading
This edition of TECHBOARD also covers the results of the Glasswing AI project, stronger NTLM protections and the real cause of November’s Microsoft 365 outage.
SignDrop turns a Windows security mechanism against the operating system to gain the highest level of privileges. Security researcher Abdelhamid Naceri has published a proof of concept for a new zero-day vulnerability that, under certain conditions, allows a local user to escalate privileges to SYSTEM. The exploit targets the Common Log File System (CLFS) driver, whose recurring vulnerabilities prompted Microsoft to introduce additional authenticity checks for log files.
That protection has now created another attack opportunity. When generating a .cnpf authentication file, an attacker can manipulate file paths and force a privileged process to write data to a location under their control. The published exploit combines this weakness with Microsoft Defender operations and a malicious DLL that is subsequently loaded by a privileged process.
SignDrop does not rely on conventional memory corruption. It exploits flawed logic across several system components, making it more difficult to address with a single patch. Microsoft said on 13 November that it was investigating the vulnerability and had found no evidence of active exploitation. The November Patch Tuesday release did not include a fix.
A vulnerability in Apache HTTP Server can corrupt server memory over HTTP/2 and potentially enable remote code execution. CVE-2026-119618 affects the mod_http2 module in Apache versions 2.4.55 through 2.4.70. A race condition in the assign_headers() function allows concurrent HTTP header processing to access the same memory structures.
The outcome can include heap corruption, a process crash or execution of attacker-controlled code. Achieving reliable RCE depends on the specific environment and the behaviour of its memory allocator. Version 2.4.71 addresses the vulnerability. On 17 November, Singapore’s cybersecurity agency warned that the flaw was being actively exploited, meaning it is no longer merely a theoretical risk.
Microsoft is changing the rules for NTLM communication, making certain NTLM relay attacks more difficult. According to its new security rollout schedule, Windows clients have offered cryptographic message signing by default since 10 November. In a signed session, an attacker cannot create a valid signature without the corresponding session key. Windows servers are expected to require signing by default from May 2027. The transition may, however, affect legacy applications and authentication integrations.
Another flaw in the Windows update infrastructure allows local privilege escalation. A public PoC for CVE-2026-88235 describes how privileged TrustedInstaller operations can be abused. As we reported in TECHBOARD #6, TrustedHive has already demonstrated how TrustedInstaller can be forced to write files without authorization by combining the Component Based Servicing interface with file-path redirection. The new finding once again highlights the security risks surrounding privileged Windows operations.
The Glasswing project reported almost 38,000 vulnerabilities, but lists only 217 as fixed. Seven months into Anthropic’s AI-assisted vulnerability discovery project, VulnCheck analysed its results. Of the 37,966 reported findings, 7,349 are publicly available, another 1,654 were classified as duplicates and researchers identified 442 associated CVEs.
According to the available data, only two of those CVEs have been confirmed as exploited in real-world attacks. VulnCheck also notes that the growing volume of reports is placing pressure on open-source maintainers. The developers of curl, for example, rejected 19 of 34 published vulnerability reports. The number of findings alone therefore says little about their severity or the quality of automated research. The distinction between identifying, validating and fixing a vulnerability remains essential.
Hackers were not behind the global Microsoft 365 outage. Its actual cause was a software defect introduced in July. According to a preliminary incident analysis published on 15 November, three problems combined during the 12–13 November outage: a latent network gateway bug, increased load after Teams traffic was redirected and the unavailability of approximately 14% of server capacity.
The defect only fully manifested on higher-performance production servers, which behaved differently from the test environment. Redirected traffic then overloaded additional nodes. At the worst point of the incident, more than 80% of the network gateway servers were unresponsive. The disruption affected Exchange Online, Outlook and features in other services, including Teams, Copilot and Defender.
Microsoft confirmed on 16 November that its safeguards had failed to prevent the issue from spreading between regions. Recovery therefore took almost 24 hours. The final incident analysis is still being prepared.
New security flaws are emerging faster than organizations can assess and remediate them. Penetration testing identifies exploitable weaknesses, verifies their real-world impact and helps you prioritize remediation.
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